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Denominating Augustine.
The Controversial Reception of Augustine’s Semiotics in 
Late Medieval and Early Protestant Scholasticism
Ueli Zahnd, Basel, Switzerland
abstract
Throughout the Middle Ages up to the 17th century, Augustine’s conception of signs, as 
presented in De doctrina christiana II, was the common starting point of any semiotic 
discussion. Around 1600, however, the majority of Lutheran scholastics started, in open 
dispute with their denominational counterparts, the Calvinists, to explicitly reject the 
father’s definition of a sign as ‘a thing which, in addition to the impression it makes 
on the senses, also brings something else to mind’. This controversy was caused less 
by differing logical assumptions and was motivated more by contradicting theological 
convictions about Christ’s presence in the Eucharist: To keep the basic (and likewise 
Augustinian) conception of the sacrament as a sign, the Lutherans, defending Christ’s 
real presence in the sacrament, had to concede a sign to be self-referential, while the 
Calvinists, conceiving of the sacrament as a reminiscential symbol of Christ’s passion, 
could hold on Augustine’s definition of a sign as referring to something else. It was this 
sacramental debate that determined the value of Augustine’s semiotic sayings, giving 
thus a denominational shape to a merely logical matter. The article aims to present this 
denominational reception of Augustine’s semiotics, analysing its theological entangle-
ments and tracing it back to the late medieval roots not only of the two conquering 
semiotic positions, but of their respective theological background as well.
To be in accordance with Augustine was, for centuries in the history of western 
Christianity, a major argument for the orthodoxy of a theologian.1 Throughout 
the Middle Ages the bishop of Hippo was the most important doctrinal author-
ity, guiding and confirming scholastics in their quest of theological truth and 
granting their congruence with tradition.2 But also the Reformers and their 
1 A first draft of this paper was presented in 2011 at the 16th International Conference on 
Patristic Studies in Oxford. I wish to thank John Magee (Toronto) and Christoph Chalamet 
(Geneva) for their valuable comments on later elaborations of the text.
2 For Augustine’s omnipresent influence in the Middle Ages see Eric L. Saak, Creating Augus-
tine. Interpreting Augustine and Augustinianism in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 2012) and his 
‘Augustine in his Late Medieval Appropriations (1200-1500)’, in Karla Pollmann (ed.), The 
Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (Oxford, 2013), 39-50, and the relevant 
chapters in Volker H. Drecoll (ed.), Augustin-Handbuch (Tübingen, 2007).
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followers, who in principle denied – as is well known – the value of traditional 
arguments, did not abandon the practice of emphatically referring to Augustine 
to prove the accordance of their teachings with his doctrine. More than a thou-
sand citations of Augustine are present in Martin Luther’s works,3 and Calvin 
went as far as claiming the North-African bishop to be totus noster – com-
pletely ours – in order to strengthen his conformance with the Latin father.4 
The motives for this kind of backing are obvious: in proving their accordance 
with Augustine, the Reformers protected themselves against any polemics 
imputing their doctrine to be new, unheard, and foreign to Christianity. Hence, 
allusions to the Latin Christendom’s most accepted father underscored, on the 
one hand, the Protestants’ intention to re-form the church and to get back to an 
authentic understanding of the Bible, while on the other, it served to make a 
charge against doctrinal adversaries: to have Augustine on one’s own side was 
an argument for the deviance of everybody else. And this, of course, was a 
strategic use of Augustine the Reformers adopted not only in their quarrels with 
the Roman Catholics, but also – and even more so – in inner-protestant disputes 
between the different denominational branches that were about to arise.5
It might thus surprise that there appears, in the early seventeenth century, in a 
seemingly marginal semiotic chapter of different Lutheran metaphysics, an 
explicit criticism of Augustine. The bone of contention was the Augustinian 
definition of a sign as it was presented in the opening paragraph of the second 
book De doctrina christiana or in Augustine’s De dialectica, and which con-
ceived of a sign as ‘a thing which’ – to use the words of De doctrina christiana – 
‘in addition to the impression it makes on the senses, also brings something 
else to mind.’6 Sebastian Kirchmaier, an early seventeenth century Lutheran 
3 Besides the respective articles in the manuals cited above see the collection by Hans-Ulrich 
Delius, Augustin als Quelle Luthers. Eine Materialsammlung (Berlin, 1984), and for an old, but 
still valuable analysis, Adolf Hamel, Der junge Luther und Augustin (Gütersloh, 1934). For a 
general overview on the use and diffusion of Augustine in the 16th century see Arnoud S.Q. Visser, 
Reading Augustine in the Reformation. The Flexibility of Intellectual Authority in Europe, 1500-
1620 (Oxford, 2011).
4 See J.M.J. Lange van Ravenswaay, Augustinus totus noster: das Augustinverständnis bei 
Johannes Calvin (Göttingen, 1990) and Robert M. Kingdom, ‘Augustine and Calvin’, in Fanny 
LeMoine and Christopher Kleinhenz (eds), Saint Augustine the Bishop: A Book of Essays (New 
York, 1994), 177-8. A still useful collection of material is provided by Luchesius Smits, Saint 
Augustin dans l’œuvre de Jean Calvin, 2 vols. (Assen, 1956-1958).
5 These two uses of Augustine were already present in Luther, see Albrecht Beutel, ‘Luther’, 
in Augustin-Handbuch, 615-22, 620; with regards also to the later developments see Irena Backus, 
‘The “Confessionaliziation” of Augustine in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation’, in The 
Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine (2013), 74-82.
6 De doctrina christiana II 1.1, CChr.SL 32 (Turnhout, 1962), 32: Signum est enim res praeter 
speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire; see De dialec-
tica V, ed. J. Pinborg (Dordrecht, 1975): Signum est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid 
animo ostendit. See Vincent Giraud, Augustin, les signes et la manifestation (Paris, 2013), 279.
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theologian, stated in a disputation he held at the university of Wittenberg that 
those definitions were inadaequatae nimis – far too insufficient –, since, as he 
explained, they unnecessarily limited the signs to perceivable things.7 Purely 
intelligible signs such as concepts or species could not match this definition so 
that, as Kirchmaier went on to explain, the recent doctors where right to expand 
the definition in a way that concepts were also included.8 Heinrich Schmid, 
who taught some years after Kirchmaier at Wittenberg, accepted this type of 
argumentation and even claimed that he optimo iure – with every good right – 
rejected the Augustinian definitions as inadequate.9
This explicit criticism of Augustine is noteworthy in two respects. One con-
cerns Augustine’s definition itself. As is well known, compared to other semiotic 
approaches of the late Antiquity this definition included for the first time lin-
guistic items into the notion of ‘sign’ which had been confined so far to indi-
cations.10 Only the Augustinian definition allowed for the linguistic approach 
we are used to in modern semiotics; but even though this was, in late Antiquity, 
an enormous expansion of what could be treated as a sign, there was in fact no 
place in Augustine’s definition, as our Lutheran authors stated, for anything 
like mental items. Quite obviously thus, the Lutherans had, compared to Augus-
tine, a rather different and an even more expanded understanding of what a sign 
could be. But obviously as well, they nevertheless still felt the need to deal with 
Augustine’s definition – if only to reject it. This is where their criticism gets 
noteworthy in a second respect: since, interestingly enough, Calvinist scholars 
of the same era continued to adhere to the Augustinian definitions, and they 
did so albeit fully aware of the difficulty of including concepts in these defini-
tions.11 Bartholomäus Keckermann, a Calvinist polymath, both in his logical 
and his metaphysical writings based his semiotics on Augustine,12 and Clemens 
7 Sebastian Kirchmaier, De signo et signato (Wittenberg, 1664), fol. B2v: Proinde inadaequa-
tae nimis, angustiores quippe suo definito descriptiones Augustini erunt.
8 S. Kirchmaier, De signo et signato (1664), fol. B2r-v: Nihilominus, quia et signa tantum 
intelligibilia, omnemque sensibilitatis rationem respuentia occurrunt, qualia sunt species sive 
noemata mentis, non immerito a recentioribus doctoribus vox ampliata fuit, ut et illa sub de|fini-
tione signi comprehendi queant.
9 Heinrich Schmid, De signo et signato (Wittenberg, 1673), fol. A2rf: Cum autem haec defi-
nitio solum signis instrumentalibus, nec omnibus accommodari | queat [...] optimo jure a nobis 
rejicitur ceu inadaequata. Not a rejection, but an amplification of the Augustinian definition is 
proposed both by Christoph Scheibler, Metaphysica divina (Oxford, 1637 [Giessen 1617]), 1,417 
and 421, and Abraham Calov, Metaphysica (Rostock, 1640), 727.
10 Besides Tilman Borsche, ‘Zeichentheorie im Übergang von den Stoikern zu Augustin’, 
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 19 (1994), 41-52 and Stephan Meier-Oeser, Die Spur des 
Zeichens. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen 
Neuzeit (Berlin, 1997), 1-7; see in particular Philip Cary, Outward Signs. The Powerlessness of 
External Things in Augustine’s Thought (Oxford, 2008). 
11 A fact that has already been stated by S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 316-9.
12 See the ‘Systema Metaphysicum’, in his Systema Systematum (Hanau, 1613), 2,1900b, and 
the ‘Systema Logicum’, ibid. 1,71a.
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Timpler, one of the most influential Calvinist scholars of the early seventeenth 
century, while explicitly agreeing to the fact that the Augustinian definitions 
were too limited,13 nevertheless maintained and even stressed that every sign 
– with the exception of concepts – had to be external and thus perceivable by 
senses. What Lutherans denied14 was stressed by Calvinists.
To the modern reader, this controversy between Calvinist and Lutheran met-
aphysicians on the validity of a single Augustinian concept looks like a rather 
marginal problem that is not worthy of such violent debates. Of course, those 
Augustinian definitions of a sign were important: throughout the Middle Ages 
and also among the Catholic contemporaries of the protestant opponents, these 
Augustinian sayings were at the core of semiotic theories;15 but throughout the 
Middle Ages – or at least ever since the fourteenth century16 – the deficiency 
of these definitions regarding concepts was well-known without leading to any 
comparable controversies. Why thus did the Protestants raise that question, and 
why did the Lutherans even risk to explicitly confront a saying of Augustine? 
In what follows, I would like to determine the motives and the background of 
this inner-protestant debate by exploring its historical origins and its systematic 
scope. For this, it will be necessary to locate the discussion in the broader 
context of the reception of Augustine’s semiotics not only in early modern, but 
rather in late medieval scholasticism. The first two sections of this article start 
thus with spots at the logical, but also at the theological reception of Augustinian 
semiotics, before, in a third step, a closer analysis will be given of the inner-
protestant debate.
1. The Reception of Augustine’s Semiotics in the Theology of Sacraments
It might not be obvious to start this survey of the afterlife of Augustine’s semi-
otics with its reception in medieval theology. But Augustine’s conception of 
what a sign is had one of its most important impacts during the Middle Ages in 
the theology of sacraments. While, in earliest Christianity, the term sacramentum 
13 Timpler’s main criticism, though, was not the problem of intelligible signs, but the one of 
animal knowledge, see his Metaphysicae systema 3,4 (Hannover, 1612), 303: Nam [definitiones 
Augustini] tantum competunt signo, quod homini aliquid significat; non vero signo, quod bestiae 
aliquid significat.
14 For further Lutheran testimonials that deny the perceptibility and exteriority of every sign 
without explicitly confronting Augustine see e.g. Johannes Scharff, Metaphysica exemplaris (Wit-
tenberg, 1634), 2,229, Adam Spengler, De signo et signato (Berlin, 1649), fol. B4r, or Johannes 
Schultetus, De signo et signato (Wittenberg, 1659), fol. A3r-v.
15 See, e.g., the introducing question of the Conimbricenses’ commentary to Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione (In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis [Coimbra, 1606], 2,5), or John of St. Thoma, 
Tractatus de signis 1,1, ed. John N. Deely (Berkeley, 1985), 116.
16 See below, section 2.1.
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was used as an equivalent to the Greek μυστήριον, it meant, from the third 
century on, not only the signified mystical things, but also the signifying things, 
the referrers, and hence the signs of a mystery.17 And one of the first who 
consequently subsumed the sacramental rites under the notion of ‘sign’ was 
Augustine. He simply defined the sacraments as sacrum signum,18 as a holy sign, 
a signifier whose signified was the mystical grace communicated by these signs. 
The parallels between sacramental rites and Augustine’s general definition of a 
sign were obvious: there were the sacramental rites, perceivable by senses be it 
in their material part such as the baptismal water, or in their locutionary part such 
as the words pronounced by the priest; and there was the aliud aliquid they 
brought to mind, namely God’s salutary action in man.
1.1 Peter Lombard, his sententiae, and their interpretation
The Latin west favorably received this Augustinian classification. In the twelfth 
century the treatment of the sacraments as a subcategory of signs was so com-
mon an approach to sacramental theology that a definition of the sacraments 
was usually done in explicit connection with the Augustinian definition of a 
sign.19 Peter Lombard, whose Sententiarum libri quatuor would become the 
standard textbook of medieval scholastic theology, labeled the fourth book on 
the sacraments simply de signis, and he confronted in the very beginning of that 
book the Augustinian understanding of a sacrament with the Augustinian defini-
tion of a sign of the beginning chapters of De doctrina christiana II.1.20
However, since sacraments were signs, one had to ask not only about how they 
complied with the Augustinian definition, but also in what sacraments could be 
specified as a particular subclass of signs. Peter Lombard noted two distinctive 
properties of sacramental signs: first, sacraments are a subclass of the given 
signs, the signa data, or, to use a more common scholastic designation, they 
belong to the signa ad placitum significantia. Unlike smoke that – belonging to 
the other class of signa naturalia – naturally relates to the fire as its signified, 
sacraments and other signa ad placita are imposed signs which, in contrast to 
17 Günther Bornkamm, ‘μυστήριον’, ThWNT 4 (1942), 809-34, and Adolf Kolping, Sacra-
mentum Tertullianeum 1. Untersuchung über die Anfänge des christlichen Gebrauches der Voka-
bel sacramentum (Münster, 1948).
18 De civitate Dei X 5, CChr.SL 40 (Turnhout, 1955), 452, l. 19.
19 For examples see Stéphane Gioanni, ‘Un florilège augustinien sur la connaissance sacra-
mentelle. Une source de Bérenger de Tours et d’Yves de Chartres?’, in Monique Goullet (ed.), 
Parva pro magnis mundera. Études de littérature tardo-antique et médiévale offertes à François 
Dolbeau par ses élèves (Turnhout, 2009), 699-723; Damien van den Eynde, Les définitions des 
sacrements pendant la première période de la théologie scolastique (1050-1240) (Roma, 1950), 
5; and, in particular, Peter Abaelard, Sic et non, ed. Ernestus Henke (Marburg, 1851), 309.
20 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, ed. Ignatius C. Brady (Grottaferrata, 
1971-1981), 2,231.
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natural signs, have no intrinsic relation to the things they signify.21 The second 
distinctive property Peter Lombard mentioned, was the similarity a sacrament was 
said to have with the thing it signified: even though there was no natural relation 
between a sacramental sign and its signified, there was, according to Peter Lom-
bard, a relation of similitude – such as the baptismal water that was seen as an 
image of the spiritual ablution of sins.22 These distinctions finally led Lombard to 
his own definition of a sacrament as ‘so great a sign of the grace of God and the 
form of invisible grace, that it bears its image and exists as its cause.’23
Yet, with the last words of that definition, Peter Lombard not only resumed 
what he had found so far as the distinctive properties of a sacrament, but he 
implicitly introduced a third property: sacraments were not only given signs of 
grace that bore a similarity of its effect, but they were also the cause of this 
effect. When, in the thirteenth century, Peter Lombard’s four books of Sentences 
became the base text of theological instruction at the recently founded universi-
ties, it was primarily this third aspect that was seen to be in need of explanation. 
Late medieval theology of sacraments in general conceived of the problem as 
the question of knowing whether these sacramental signs could have themselves 
an effect to the communication of grace and function as its real causes, or 
whether they were just signifying acts on whose application God alone com-
municated the sacramental grace.24 On that question, the scholastics were split 
into two groups. While Thomas Aquinas and his followers argued for a coop-
eration of the sacraments and introduced the notion of instrumental causality, a 
causality which did not cause the grace itself, but a preliminary disposition to 
its acceptance such as the baptismal character, Bonaventura, Scotus, and in their 
following the Scotists and the Nominalists denied any active involvement of the 
sacraments, claiming that God alone by virtue of a pact he had made with the 
church every time produced the grace when a sacrament was administered.25
21 Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV 1.4, ed. I. Brady (1981), 2,233: Signorum vero alia sunt 
naturalia, ut fumus significans ignem; alia data; et eorum quae data sunt, quaedam sunt Sacra-
menta, quaedam non. See Augustine, De doctrina christiana II 1.2, CChr.SL 32, 32-3.
22 Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV 1.4, ed. I. Brady (1981), 2,233: Sacramentum eius rei simi-
litudinem gerit, cuius signum est. Si enim Sacramenta non haberent similitudinem rerum, quarum 
Sacramenta sunt, proprie Sacramenta non dicerentur. See Augustine, Epistula 98.9, CChr.SL 31A 
(Turnhout, 2005), 233.
23 Peter Lombard, Sententiae IV 1.4, ed. I. Brady (1981) 2,233: Sacramentum enim proprie 
dicitur quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et 
causa existat. See Irène Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace. Signe, rituel, sacré (Paris, 2004), 96-8.
24 E.g. Peter Auriol, In quartum librum sententiarum d.1, q.1 (Roma, 1605), fol. 9a: Utrum in 
Sacramentis novae legis […] oporteat ponere virtutem influxam Sacramentis formaliter inhae-
rentem, quae sit causa gratiae in anima nostra effective, ita quod Deus mediantibus Sacramentis 
virtute eis infusa, dicatur gratiam in anima creare.
25 For recent literature on this debate see I. Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace (2004), and Ueli 
Zahnd, Wirksame Zeichen? Sakramentenlehre und Semiotik in der Scholastik des ausgehenden 
Mittelalters (Tübingen, 2014).
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The Augustinian definition of a sign was in the background of that debate 
insofar as it was not clear whether its last part, the aliud faciens in cogitationem 
venire, was to be understood as an act of causation or not. Was the sign in its 
action of bringing something to mind a real cause of that something brought to 
mind? The Thomists, of course, would affirm this. As evidence for his doctrine 
of instrumental causality, Thomas Aquinas himself relied on the example of a 
teachers’ audible speech, a sermo audibilis, which was said to be a cause of 
learning26 since it contained in some way the intentiones animae, the concepts 
the verbal signs were able to evoke.27 Scotus, however, took the opposite stand. 
For him, it was manifestly false to suppose that an audible speech would for-
mally contain the concepts it signifies: there is senseless speech which does not 
signify anything,28 and there are in different languages different words for the 
same thing, which I all would be able to understand if all these words would 
cause by themselves the concept of the signified thing.29 Hence, the aliud a sign 
brings to mind, could not be caused by the sign itself, rather for Scotus its con-
cept was formerly caused by apprehension of the signified thing. Only then and 
since the sign and the concept were related to the same thing, the intellect was 
capable of linking a perceived word with its respective concept, and so to under-
stand what had been said.30
26 See the Auctoritates Aristotelis, VII.5, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Louvain, 1974), 196: Sermo 
audibilis existens ex causa disciplinae non per se, sed per accidens, id est in quantum, significat 
aliquid.
27 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super sententiis IV d.1, q.1, a.4, qc.2, ad 4, ed. Maria F. Moos 
(Paris, 1947), 35-6: In re corporali non potest esse virtus spiritualis secundum esse completum; 
potest tamen ibi esse per modum intentionis, sicut in instrumentis motis ab artifice est virtus artis, 
et sermo audibilis existens causa disciplinae, ut dicitur in Libro de sensu et sensato continet 
intentiones animae quodammodo.
28 Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.1, p.3, q.1-2, n.302, ed. Vaticana (Roma, 2008), 107: Exempla, quae 
adducta sunt de virtute recepta in instrumento, non concludunt. Primum, de sensibili sermone, 
accipit manifeste falsum, nam sermo audibilis non habet in se formaliter aliquam intentionem 
animae. Quod probatur, quia sermo non impositus ad significandum, nullam talem formam habet 
in se (hoc patet omnibus); per impositionem autem non recipit aliquam formam absolutam, nec 
relationem nisi forte rationis.
29 Ibid.: Hoc etiam probatur aliter, quia eodem existente agente principali et instrumento 
sufficiente, sequitur eadem actio; sed si latinus proferat verba latina graeco, idem est agens 
principale (et instrumentum, quod esset si loqueretur alii latino), tamen non sequitur effectus, 
quia nullus conceptus causatur in graeco audiente; ergo ille sermo non erat instrumentum ex se 
ad causandum conceptum animae in audiente.
30 Ibid. n.303, 107-8: Sermo audibilis est signum rememorativum respectu conceptus, ita quod 
facta immutatione sensus ab ipso sermone, et ulterius intellecta natura eius in quantum talis 
natura est, intellectus cognoscens ipsum esse impositum ad significandum talem naturam, ex 
collatione eius ad illud aliud intelligit illud aliud non ita quod sermo per aliquam formam causat 
conceptum de aliqua re, sed conceptus est praevius ad conceptum de re quae causatur per propriam 
speciem rei vel phantasma in anima.
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1.2 Linguistic parallels
Based on the Augustinian understanding of the sacraments as signs, both 
Thomas and Scotus were led to discuss a number of rather linguistic questions 
within their sacramental theology and to give evidence of differing models of 
how language works. But since the Augustinian wording of faciens in cogita-
tionem venire was reconcilable with both positions, their discussions resulted in 
a different understanding, indeed, but not in a criticism of Augustine – at least 
not in view of this last part of his definition. In view of the definition’s restric-
tion to perceivable things, however, Augustine’s wording got problematic. 
Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, explicitly 
devoted a whole quaestiuncula to the problem of knowing whether the Augus-
tinian definition of a sign was well done or not.31 Amongst the three arguments 
against the validity of the definition, two faced its restriction on perceivable 
things. One was based on the premise that every effect can be said to be a sign 
of its cause – but since there are spiritual effects which obviously are not per-
ceivable by senses, not every sign can be said to be sensible.32 The other rested 
upon the premise that every interlocution is based on signs – yet angels com-
municate without having any senses, so again not every sign can be said to be 
sensible.33 However, it is not so much these present arguments and their refuta-
tion which are interesting for the present purpose (in both cases, Thomas showed 
that the arguments were based on false premises34). Much more interesting is 
the fact that, although the treatment of causes as signs can already be seen as an 
expansion of the scope of Augustine’s definition, one prominent argument against 
it was still missing, namely the one initially cited with the Lutheran theologians 
who confronted the Augustinian definition with purely mental signs. Apparently, 
this kind of argumentation did not matter for Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of 
a sign. Without losing a word on concepts he rather could continue, by rejecting 
the alleged arguments, to explicitly defend the Augustinian restriction of signs 
to sensible things.35
31 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum IV d.1, q.1, a.1, qc.2, ed. F. Moos (1947), 9-10, 13-4.
32 Ibid., arg.2, ed. F. Moos (1947), 10: Secundum philosophum in libro priorum, omnis effectus 
suae causae signum esse potest. Sed quidam effectus sunt spirituales, qui nullam speciem ingerunt 
sensibus. Ergo non omne signum aliquam speciem sensibus ingerit. On this argument, see already 
Richard Fishacre, In quartum librum sententiarum d.1, p.1, q.3, arg.1, ed. prov. Joseph Goering, 
24. 
33 Ibid., arg.3: Omnis locutio fit per aliqua signa. Sed Angeli loquuntur non prolato aliquo 
sensibili sermone, ut in II lib. d. 11 dictum est. Ergo non omne signum est sensibile. See Fishacre, 
In quartum d.1, p.1, q.3, arg.1, ed. prov. J. Goering 24.
34 Ibid., ed. F. Moos (1947), 14.
35 Ibid., ed. F. Moos (1947), 13: ideo signum quantum ad primam sui institutionem significat 
aliquam rem sensibilem, prout per eam manuducimur in cognitionem alicujus occulti. See also 
his Quaestiones de potentia q.6, a.10, arg.6, ed. Paul M. Pession (Turin, 1949), 54.
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1.3 Scotus’ expansion of the definition’s scope
In Scotus, however, matters are slightly different. There is only one place in his 
commentary on the fourth book of Lombard’s Sentences where he explicitly 
refers to Augustine’s definition of a sign, and this is in distinction six where he 
discusses the question whether or not the character impressed in baptism is an 
absolute form of the baptised human.36 As already mentioned, this character had 
a rather important function in the sacramental model of Thomas Aquinas, since 
it was this character which was the intrinsic effect of the baptismal sacrament 
itself: it was in effecting this character that, for Thomas, the sacrament of bap-
tism could be understood as an instrumental cause.37 Scotus, however, whose 
model of sacramental efficiency denied any intrinsic causality of the sacraments, 
was reserved in accepting the impression of such a character,38 and Scotus cer-
tainly did not conceive of it as an absolute form. Now, Thomas had argued for 
this formally absolute character by its being a sign, a lasting sign namely of 
the baptismal act.39 But since, for Thomas, a relation could not be the base of 
another relation – for him, this would lead to an infinite regress – and since 
signification was a kind of relation, it was obvious for Thomas that the signify-
ing character could not be itself a relational entity.40 
Scotus responded by denying Thomas’ premise. For Scotus, it was well 
possible that a relational entity was itself the fundament of yet another relation 
such as the cognition of an earlier and a later,41 and it was in view of this 
argument that Scotus suddenly was led to expand the scope of the Augustinian 
definition of a sign: ‘When’, Scotus wrote, ‘according to Augustine a sign is 
a thing which in addition to the impression it makes on the senses, also brings 
something else to mind, which is’, Scotus adds, ‘true not only of sensible signs, 
where “sense” is strictly understood as corporeal sense, but also of an incor-
poreal sense, when “sense” is generally understood as cognitive faculty, then 
I say, that there is nothing from whose cognition one could not get into the 
36 Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.6, p.4, a.2, q.2, n.302, ed. Vaticana (2008), 388.
37 Thomas, Scriptum IV d.1, q.1, a.4, qc.5, n.127, ed. F. Moos (1947), 32.
38 Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.6, p.4, a.2, q.1, n.246, ed. Vaticana (2008), 370: Propter igitur solam 
auctoritatem Ecclesiae – quantum occurrit ad praesens – est ponendum characterem imprimi.
39 Thomas, Scriptum IV d.4, q.1, a.1, qc.1, ed. F. Moos (1947), 149: Signum per formam quam 
sensibus vel intellectui imprimit, facit aliquid in cognitionem venire. Similiter etiam nihil distin-
guitur ab alio nisi per aliquam formam. Similitudo etiam est relatio super unitate qualitatis fun-
data, ut dicitur in V Meta. Unde patet quod quaelibet illarum relationum quam importat character, 
requirit aliquam formam substratam; et cum non sit forma substantialis, quia forma substantialis 
in sacramentis non datur, relinquitur quod forma substrata sit qualitas quaedam, cujus unitas 
consignificationis similitudinem facit.
40 Ibid. 150: Cum ergo character ordinetur ad aliquid simpliciter [...] non potest esse quod 
qualitas supra quam fundatur relatio characteris sit habitus, sed magis potentia.
41 Scotus, Ordinatio IV d.6, p.4, a.2, q.2, n.302, ed. Vaticana (2008), 388: Nihil est ex cuius 
cognitione non possit devenire in cognitionem alterius, saltem ut ex cognitione posterioris in 
prius, quin illud posterius possit dici signum.
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cognition of something else.’42 In other words, a cognition could refer to 
another cognition, a relation could be the base of another relation, hence, con-
cepts could be treated as signs.
Whereas Thomas Aquinas defended the restriction of Augustine’s definition 
on sensible things and, in doing so, not even thought about clarifying the status 
of concepts within this semiotic discussion, Scotus was led to expand the Augus-
tinian definition from sensible things to anything affecting the potentia cogni-
tiva. The two models of sacramental efficacy Thomas and Scotus were working 
with seem thus not only to have been related with two different models of how 
language works, but much more basically with two different models of what a 
sign is. But in order to better understand this difference, we have to turn from 
sacramental theology to the reception of the Augustinian semiotics in late medi-
eval logic.
2. The Augustinian definition in late medieval logic
There is one main reason for treating the reception of Augustine’s semiotics in 
medieval logic only in the second place after its reception in theology: The main 
source for semiotics in medieval logic was not Augustine, but Boethius’ transla-
tion and commentary of Aristotle’s Perihermeneias. In the starting chapter of 
that book, Aristotle wrote about the relation between things, words, scripture 
and the passiones animae, the concepts those entities were able to evoke in a 
human’s mind.43 For our present purposes, this description matters insofar as 
Boethius interpreted both the relation between a written entity and a spoken 
word, and the one between a spoken word and a concept as a relation of signi-
fication, whereas he described, in accordance with Aristotle, the relation between 
a concept and a thing as one of similarity.44 
Two points are of special interest in view of the later developments: First 
and in opposition to the Augustinian approach, this Aristotelian presentation 
42 Ibid.: Si ‘signum est – secundum Augustinum De doctrina christiana – quod praeter noti-
tiam, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud in cognitionem venire facit’ (quod verum est non solum de 
signo sensibili, accipiendo ‘sensum’ stricte pro sensu corporali, sed verum est etiam accipiendo 
sensum generaliter pro potentia cognitiva), – accipiendo igitur ‘sensum’ aliter pro potentia cogni-
tiva, sic dico quod nihil est ex cuius cognitione non possit devenire in cognitionem alterius.
43 Boethius, De interpretatione I.1, ed. Carolus Meiser (Leipzig, 1880), 3: Sunt ergo ea quae 
sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt 
in voce. Et quemadmodum nec litterae omnibus eaedem, sic nec voces eaedem. Quorum autem 
haec primorum notae, eaedem omnibus passiones animae et quorum hae similitudines, res etiam 
eaedem.
44 Ibid. 37: Cum igitur haec sint quattuor: res, intellectus, vox, littera, rem concipit intellectus, 
intellectum vero voces designant, ipsa vero voces litterae significant. Intellectus vero animae 
quaedam passio est. Nisi enim quandam similitudinem rei quam quis intellegit in animae ratione 
patiatur nullus est intellectus.
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was rather epistemological than linguistic.45 The ordering of these entities 
– scripture, words, concepts, and things – was inspired by theories of percep-
tion rather than by thoughts on intersubjective communication. Nevertheless, 
there is no explicit discord between the two approaches, and this is the second 
point of interest: in stating a difference between the concept-thing-relation and 
the other two relations (word-concept and scripture-word), the passiones ani-
mae kept a special state: they were similitudines, not signs, and hence they did 
not challenge the Augustinian restriction of signs to sensible things at all. So, 
when Thomas Aquinas in his questioning of the Augustinian definition did not 
argue with the passiones animae, he presented himself as a close follower not 
only of Augustine, but also of the Boethian tradition.
2.1 Concepts as signs
Interestingly enough, however, in the middle of the thirteenth century medieval 
logicians started to think of concepts as signs. Even though it complied neither 
with the Augustinian nor with the Boethian approach, there was an increasing 
number especially among English scholars who considered the relation between 
the passiones animae and the things as one of signification.46 The reasons for 
this change in the understanding of the passiones animae are not very clear. 
This might have been predisposed in Boethius’ text itself, where it was a rather 
small step to expand the analogy in the relation between writings and words 
and between words and concepts to the one between concepts and things.47 
What is more, this new understanding of concepts might depend on reflections 
on syncathegorematical terms which were conceived to function as a kind of 
signs of second degree;48 and it might depend on an epistemological interpreta-
tion of the Aristotelian premise already present in Thomas Aquinas, namely 
that every effect can be considered as a sign of its cause – and concepts in an 
epistemological sense were affected by the perceived things.49 It might, more 
45 On this difference see the fundamental article by Alfonso Maierù, ‘Signum dans la culture 
médiévale’, in Jan P. Beckmann (ed.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (Berlin, 1981), 51-72; 
on the epistemological bias of the Boethian approach see John Magee, Boethius on Signification 
and Mind (Leiden a.o., 1989), 56-7, and Taki Suto, Boethius on Mind, Grammar and Logic. 
A Study of Boethius’ Commentaries on Peri hermeneias (Leiden a.o., 2012), 65-6.
46 On this fundamental change see S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 77-113.
47 Jan Pinborg, ‘Roger Bacon on Signs. A newly recovered part of the Opus Maius’, in J. P. Beck-
mann (ed.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (1981), 403-12, 407, and Earline J. Ashworth, 
‘The Doctrine of Signs in some Early Sixteenth-Century Spanish Logicians’, in Ignacio Angelelli 
and Angel d’Ors (eds), Estudios de historia de la logica. Actas del II simposio de historia de la 
logica, Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 25-27 de mayo de 1987 (Pamplona, 1990), 13-38, 
24.
48 S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 77.
49 See Richard Fishacre, In quartum d.1, p.1, q.3, arg.5, ed. prov. J. Goering, 24: Item, cum 
intelligibilia et sensibilia possunt esse significata, et intelligibilia et sensibilia possunt esse signa, 
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interestingly in view of Augustine, depend on the latter’s statements of an 
inner, mental discourse which allowed for a linguistic approach to concepts.50 
Most probably, however, and most interesting for the present purposes, this 
new understanding of the concepts might also have been inspired by sacramental 
theology. Already two generations before Scotus, Richard Fishacre, a theologian 
working at Oxford in the middle of the thirteenth century, was led to conclude 
in his discussion of our well-known baptismal character that there obviously were 
some signs, like this character, that were not sensible at all.51
Whatever amalgam of these probable reasons might have resulted in this new 
understanding of a concept, its effects were rather distinct: while this new con-
ception was easily reconcilable with the Boethian idea of similarity, the Augus-
tinian definition with its restriction on sensible things got problematic. It was 
still in the thirteenth century that some logicians became aware of the deficiency 
of the Augustinian wording and started to question its validity as a universal 
definition of what a sign is. Roger Bacon, in his De signis explicitly stated that 
not every sign was brought to the senses, as the vulgata descriptio signi supposed;52 
and Pseudo-Kilwardby noted that this definition was not universally true of 
every sign, since the passiones animi were signs as well.53
Through the different lines of tradition in logic and sacramental theology, and 
in confrontation with the Boethian epistemological approach, the Augustinian 
definition of a sign was thus seriously challenged. There is however one striking 
thing: while these logicians – as well as Scotus in his sacramental theology – 
restricted the definition’s validity or expanded it to their new needs, they con-
tinued to include Augustine’s approach in at least parts of their semiotics and 
did not generally reject it in a way comparable to what our initially mentioned 
Lutheran authors would do. And this is true not only for these authors of the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth century, but for late medieval logic in general. 
quia in utroque genere sunt causae et causata, et causata sunt signa causarum, quid est quod hac 
definitione signi dicitur tantum sensibilia esse signa et tantum intelligibilia esse significata?
50 See S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 78 n. 153. On this inner, mental discourse of the soul see 
V. Giraud, Augustin (2013), 185-95.
51 Richard Fishacre, In quartum d.1, p.1, ad q.3, ed. prov. J. Goering 28: Fateor aliqua signa 
sunt tantum intelligibilia, et speciem nullam ingerunt sensibus, sicut dictae rationes probant. Unde 
haec non est universalis definitio signorum, sed eorum quae propriissime, et magis communiter, 
et magis utiliter sunt signa. On this, see Irène Rosier, La parole comme acte. Sur la grammaire 
et la sémantique au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1994), 114.
52 See ‘An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s “Opus maius” : “De signis”’, ed. K.M. Fredborg, 
L. Nielsen and J. Pinborg, Traditio 34 (1978), 75-136, 82: A sign is illud quod oblatum sensui vel 
intellectui aliquid designat ipsi intellectui, quoniam non omne signum offertur sensui ut vulgata 
descriptio signi supponit, sed aliquod soli intellectui offertur .
53 K.M. Fredborg et al., ‘The Commentary on “Priscianus Maior” ascribed to Robert Kilwardby’, 
CIMAGL 15 (1975), 1-143, 4: Potest etiam dici quod ista definitio non est universaliter vera 
de quolibet signo quia passiones animi sunt signa rerum et tamen non ingerunt speciem suam 
sensibus.
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While an understanding of concepts as signs was indeed widely accepted in as 
late as the middle of the fourteenth century, the Augustinian definition neverthe-
less continued to be received.
A short look at the further development of semiotics in late medieval logic 
may confirm this. As is well known, the emergence of Nominalism in the four-
teenth century had a huge impact into late medieval scholasticism in general and 
resulted in the famous Wegestreit that split the German universities into two 
main viae, two ways of doing philosophy.54 Basically, the debate between those 
viae was about some fundamental presuppositions on how much philosophy 
could be a means of doing theology; but in some sense, it depended as well on 
this new understanding of concepts as signs: no one was as consequent in apply-
ing this new understanding as William of Ockham, and his famous conception 
of universals as particular signs that were able to designate multiple things was 
intrinsically linked with that new semiotic approach to concepts.55 Apparently, 
even though the understanding of concepts as signs was generally accepted from 
the fourteenth century on, it was still disputable to what extent this was to be 
implemented in logic and whether the Boethian understanding of concepts as 
similarities was still a demarcating feature of these conceptual signs. Unsurpris-
ingly thus, the positions that resulted in the different viae of the fifteenth century 
differed in particular logical problems, too, and had notably an effect on some 
semiotic problems. For the present purposes, it will be sufficient to mention two 
of them.
2.2 A sign’s significational force
A first semiotic problem concerns the question where a given sign, a signum ad 
placitum significans, had its significational force from. As already mentioned, 
this kind of signs was thought to have been imposed to signify, and it is easily 
discernible what inspired – in the Christian Middle Ages – such a concept of 
imposition: it is the story of Adam walking through the garden of Eden and 
giving the things their names.56 The label, however, that was commonly attached 
to this class of sings – to signify ad placitum, by convenience – suggested a 
54 See Maarten J. Hoenen, ‘Via Antiqua and Via Moderna in the Fifteenth Century. Doctrinal, 
Institutional, and Church Political Factors in the Wegestreit’, in Russel L. Friedman and Lauge 
O. Nielsen (eds), The Medieval Heritage in early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-
1700 (Dordrecht, 2003), 9-26, and id. ‘Nominalismus als universitäre Spekulationskontrolle’, 
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 73 (2006), 349-74.
55 William of Ockham, Summa logicae I.14, ed. Philotheus Boehner (St. Bonaventure NY, 
1957), 49; see Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Aldershot, 2004), 45: ‘That concepts 
should be signs, therefore, is a crucial requirement of Ockham’s nominalism.’
56 See Gilbert Dahan, ‘Nommer les êtres. Exégèse et théories du langage dans les commen-
taires médiévaux de Genèse 2,19-20’, in Steve Ebbesen (ed.), Sprachtheorien in Spätantike und 
Mittelalter (Tübingen, 1995), 55-74.
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rather different conception, namely the one of a community of speakers that 
simply agreed to use a word in this or that manner. Accordingly, there were two 
main positions in late medieval semiotics. On the one side, a Scotist like Peter 
of Tartaret or a Nominalist like John Mair who both were working in Paris at 
the turn of the 16th century, conceived of the signum ad placitum as one that 
represented its significatum by its voluntary use, and that signified thus by mere 
convenience.57
For the Thomists, on the other side, this conception of a voluntary or even 
arbitrary use of signs appears to have been opposed to their basic understanding 
of language.58 John Versor, a Parisian master from the middle of the 15th century 
who was particularly used by the Thomists in Cologne,59 explained where it 
would lead to if the signification of a word was exposed to anybody’s willing: 
the word’s ‘signification would be infinitely variable and, as a consequence, 
there would be no certain knowledge of its signification.’60 The notion of ad 
placitum was thus only to be attributed to the placet of a word’s first impositor. 
It is his authority, that guarantees in the Thomistic understanding the reliable 
signification of a word, and it is due to this first impositor – and not to interlo-
cutionary convenience – that words have a significational force: 
It includes two things to be a voice that signifies: the first is material and it is the voice 
itself. The second is formal and is the force to signify and to actually represent its signi-
fied. This force has been conveyed to the voice by its institution and its assignment to 
signify. And this force [...] is given to it through the imposition by its first impositor, who 
assigns the voice to one signified and not to the other.61
57 Petrus Tartaretus, Expositio in summulas Petri Hispani iuxta mentem Scoti I.3 (Basel, 1514), 
fol. 3va: Significare ad placitum est ex impositione vel usu voluntario repraesentare suum signi-
ficatum; and John Mair, Termini (Paris, 1502), fol B3rb: Significare ad placitum est ex imposi-
tione vel usu representare. Aliqui termini ex sola consuetudine sua significata important.
58 Magnus Hundt, a rather late Thomist commentator of Peter of Spain from Leipzig, explains 
why ad placitum is not a synonym of ad voluntatem: Dicitur vox significativa ad placitum et non 
vox significativa ad voluntatem quia impositio vocis fit ab extra, quia a proprietatibus rei, et 
terminatur ad intra. Sed ad placitum est actus voluntatis qui incipit ab extra et terminatur ab 
intra. Voluntas autem incipit ab intra et terminatur ab extra. Ergo dicitur vox significativa ad 
placitum et non ad voluntatem (Compendium totius logicae [Leipzig, 1501], fol. D2v).
59 Versor’s position in the Wegestreit is not as clear as his reception by the Cologne Thomists 
might suggest, see Pepijn Rutten, ‘“Secundum processum et mentem Versoris”. John Versor and 
His Relation to the Schools of Thought Reconsidered’, Vivarium 43 (2005), 292-329.
60 John Versor, Super septem tractatus Petri Hispani (Nürnberg, 1495), fol. a8r: Si vox signi-
ficaret ad placitum, suam significatio erit variabilis in infinitum et per consequens nulla est certa 
cognitio de significatione vocis significative. [...] Dicendum quod illud quod sit ad placitum 
cuiuslibet variatur in infinitum, non tamen illud quod sit determinate ad placitum unius sicut est 
vox significativa quae significat solum ad placitum primi instituentis.
61 Ibid. fol. a6v: Vox significativa duo includit. Primum est materiale quod est ipsa vox. Secun-
dum est formale quod est ipsa virtus significandi et representandi actualiter suum significatum. 
Que virtus sibi convenit per institutionem et ordinationem ad significandum. [...] Et datur ipsi voci 
quandoque per impositionem primi imponentis qui ordinat vocem ad unum significatum et non 
aliud; quandoque pervenit per ordinationem quae fit ab instinctu nature qui inclinat animalia ad 
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The parallels between these two different models of the origin of the significa-
tional force of a word and the two models of sacramental efficacy are obvious: 
where, on the one hand, the Thomists thought of sacramental and linguistic 
signs as entities that, after their imposition, once and for all intrinsically and 
somehow formally bore the force to cause their effect (be it to signify or be it 
to instrumentally cooperate in the administration of grace), both the Scotists and 
the Nominalists thought, on the other hand, of the production of signification as 
well as of the sacramental communication of grace as the effect of a mere semi-
otic convention. Just as in sacramental theology, the Augustinian indetermi-
nation on a sign’s functioning, i.e. on how it was to be understood that a sign 
‘brings something to mind’, led in late medieval semiotics, too, to two compet-
ing models.
2.3 Self-referentiality
But there was, besides this functional aspect (and besides the restriction of 
signs to sensible things) yet a third aspect in Augustine’s definition that, in late 
medieval logic, got problematic. In the wording of Augustine’s definition a sign 
was a thing that also brings aliud aliquid to mind – something else than itself. 
Late medieval logic discussed this condition as the question of knowing whether 
a sign could signify itself or not. Our Scotist, Peter Tartaret, explicitly rejected 
the possibility of a sign’s self-referentiality since otherwise, he argued, it would 
be impossible to distinguish between a signifying and a non-signifying sound, 
between words and simple noises.62 Others however, and interestingly both the 
followers of the via of Thomas Aquinas and the Nominalists, insisted in the 
contrary and claimed the possibility of a sign to be a sign of itself. Peter of Ailly, 
counted among the Nominalists and very influential in the fifteenth century, 
defined the natural signification in its most proper sense as ‘representing some-
thing to the cognitive faculty by itself and not by means of something else […], 
and this is how we say that a concept which is naturally a similarity of a certain 
thing, properly represents this thing.’63 Apparently, the understanding of concepts 
formandum voces suas effectus representantes. Ex quo patet quod ad vocem significativam primo 
requiritur quod habeat significatum eius cuius ipsa est signum. Secundo requiritur quod habeat 
ordinationem ad talem significatum vel secundum placitum imponentis vel secundum instinctum 
nature.
62 Petrus Tartaretus, Expositio, fol. 3va: Ad hoc quod vox sit significativa requiritur quod 
significet aliquid aliud a se, quia si non, tunc omnis vox esset significativa cum omnis vox signi-
ficet se. Requiritur etiam quod significet aliud a prolatore, quia non sic significat suum prola-
torem nisi suppleta illa vox esset imposita ad significandum suum prolatorem. Requiritur etiam 
quod significet aliud a sibi simili vel aliqua vel aliqualiter. Sequitur ex hoc diffinitio vocis non 
significative – puta quod vox non significativa est quae non est nata significare aliquid aliud a 
se vel sibi simili vel suo prolatore vel aliqua vel aliqualiter.
63 Peter of Ailly, Conceptus, ed. Ludger Kacmareck, in Modi significandi und ihre Destruktionen 
(Münster, 1980), 81-101, 88: Significare naturaliter proprie est aliquid se ipso et non mediante alio 
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as signs came into conflict not only with the restriction to sensible things, but 
also with this ‘something-else’-stipulation; and this was obviously due to the 
conjunction of the semiotic understanding of concepts with the Boethian under-
standing of concepts as similarities: if similarity is the fundament of a semiotic 
relation, then the sign’s most proper signified is this similar property which is 
not only in the signified thing, but in the similar sign as well. And hence, because 
of this similar property, the sign is a sign of itself. Now, in concepts, when 
regarded as signs, signifier and signified were not only similar, but identical – 
the sign thus even coincided with its signified, and there was nothing left for an 
aliud aliquid.64
Yet, this Boethian conception of similarity was even more present in the 
Thomistic approach, and that, again, was due to their epistemology: in their 
theory of perception, Thomists usually postulated the existence of species, these 
kinds of mental representations that were abstracted in the phantasia from the 
sensual impression; and they conceived of those species as the sensual impres-
sion’s similarities.65 Hence, while Nominalists had to accept a self-referentiality 
in concepts as the proper natural signs, someone like John Versor could claim 
that any sound and any sign – communicating through the senses its similarity 
to the phantasia – was first and foremost a sign of itself: even meaningless 
sounds without any proper signification were considered to be signs, namely 
signs of themselves.66 This is exactly the conclusion the Scotist Peter Tartaret 
had tried to preclude, and, indeed, in his own definition of a sign, Tartaret explic-
itly demanded that a sign, in order to be a sign, had to signify something aliud 
a sibi simili, something else than what was similar to the sign itself.67
As a result, in late medieval logic two inverse developments become appar-
ent in the interpretation of the Boethian ordering of scripture, words, passiones 
animae and things: while, on the one hand, Nominalist and Scotist authors started 
to translate the semiotic character of the relation between the first three entities 
into the relation between passiones animae and things, Thomists translated the 
similarity-relation between these last two entities into the relation between words 
and concepts. This fits, once again, with the two linguistic and sacramental mod-
els supported by these schools of thought: just as with instrumental causality and 
aliquid potentie cognitive eam vitaliter immutando representare, et sic dicimus conceptum qui est 
naturalis similitudo alicuius rei proprie representare.
64 On this problem of self-referentiality see S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 178-9, and E.J. Ash-
worth, ‘Doctrine of Signs’ (1990), 22.
65 See Jorg A. Tellkamp, Sinne, Gegenstände und Sensibilia: Zur Wahrnehmungslehre des 
Thomas von Aquin (Leiden, 1999), 236-7.
66 John Versor, Super septem tractatus, fol. a7r: Vox non significativa est quae auditui nihil 
representat quod intelligitur, quia nihil representat praeter seipsam per modum signi. Licet bene 
representat seipsam per modum signi, non tamen bene representat seipsam per modum rei; sicut 
bu ba, quae voces nihil representant.
67 See above, note 60.
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the Thomistic model of the significational force, similarity concerns an intrinsic 
property of a thing, too, while an emphasis on the purely semiotic relation con-
curs with the covenantal approach of Scotists and Nominalists.
The Augustinian inclusion of both words and sacraments into the notion of 
sign resulted thus in two similar models of the functioning of sacramental and 
linguistic items. The medieval expansion, however, of the notion of signs to 
concepts led to a problematization of this very starting point of the discussion, 
i.e. the proper wording of the Augustininan definition of a sign. In this sense, the 
definition’s consequent application in different fields of late medieval thought 
ended up in its own invalidation. Yet, the different schools of thought of late 
medieval logic dealt differently with the definition’s deficiencies. The Nomi-
nalists, who only had a problem to bring the definition into agreement with 
their understanding of concepts as signs, tried to find their way with Augustine, 
discussed the definition and pointed to its limited validity. One of their most 
common way to do so was to say that the Augustinian definition was valid for 
any sign except concepts.68 The Thomists, however, whose conception of self-
referentiality in any sign was fundamentally opposed to the Augustinian under-
standing, just started to ignore the Latin father’s definition in their logical writ-
ings and replaced it by a definition they attributed to Cicero.69
The reception of Augustine’s definition of a sign brought thus forth, at the 
end of the Middle Ages, two ways of handling its deficiencies: one was to put 
it aside, and the other was to restrict its validity. Obviously, this is rather close 
to what the Lutherans and Calvinists would do, even if there was only an 
implicit rejection of the definition by our Thomist authors, and not an explicit 
refusal as the Lutherans would present. It is thus time to finally turn back to 
these protestant authors and to see, if this parallel is just coincidental, or if there 
was more at stake.
3. Augustine’s semiotics and the inner-protestant debates
In early protestant scholasticism, discussions of Augustine’s definition took 
place, as initially has been shown, in logical and metaphysical writings. On 
the surface, the discussion’s primary concern was thus philosophical and 
seems to have continued what we have had in late medieval logic. However, 
68 E.g. John Mair, Summulae in collegio Montis acuti composite (Paris, 1516), fol. 2ra, where 
the Augustinian definition only pertains to one of four different understandings of a sign. A similar 
example provides Domingo de Soto, Summulae (Salamanca, 1554), fol. 2vb. On this passage see 
S. Meier-Oeser, Spur (1997), 137 n. 90.
69 See John Versor, Super septem tractatus (1495), fol. a6v: Signum autem ut dicit Tullius est 
quod se primo offert sensui aliquid relinquens intellectui. Magnus Hundt, Compendium (1501), 
fol. D1v uses this definition without any attribution. On the possible origins of this definition see 
I. Rosier-Catach, La parole efficace (2004), 50.
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when turning back to the Calvinist authors and reading how Timpler continued 
to defend the sensual perceptibility of signs, one suddenly gets from a semi-
otic question into a debate – on the Eucharist! Based on his understanding of 
sensible signs, Timpler concluded: ‘It is therefore obvious, that those are in 
vehement error who claim the Eucharist to consist of a twofold sign, one exter-
nal, namely bread and wine, and one internal, namely the body and blood of 
Christ.’70 Apparently, in this inner-protestant debate, there was lurking behind 
an ostensibly purely logical controversy a theological discussion of the right 
understanding of the sacraments and the Eucharist in particular.
This commingling of theological and logical problems is comprehensible 
against the background of the medieval reception of Augustine’s semiotics, 
which had, as we have seen, not only its logical afterlife, but was also received 
in the theology of sacraments. And this understanding survived the Reforma-
tion. It is true that, regarding medieval sacramental theology, Luther and his 
followers were relentless in criticizing the number, the practices, or the pre-
sumed efficacy of sacraments as they were conceived by Roman Catholics. 
They never questioned, however, the fundamental Augustinian conception of 
the sacraments as signs.71 As a matter of fact, this basic definition was one of 
the rare points of accordance not only with the Roman Catholics, but among 
the different protestant parties as well. In many other aspects of their respective 
understanding of the sacraments, the differences between the two main branches 
of early Protestantism were fundamental – actually, their differences in that 
question were, in the late fifteen twenties and early fifteen thirties, the main 
reason for the separation of the Protestant movement into a Lutheran and a 
Reformed camp. While Luther, although rejecting the doctrine of transubstan-
tiation, still admitted Christ’s physical appearance in the Eucharist and devel-
oped his doctrine of ‘real presence’, Zwingli, and later on the Calvinists, denied 
such an eventful dimension.72 Hence for the Lutherans, the sacraments were 
signs in a twofold way, be it as a corporeal thing (e.g. the bread) that signified 
a celestial thing (the body of Christ), or as a conglomerate of terrestrial bread 
and the real present Christ that, as a whole, signified Gods promise of grace.73 
70 Metaphysicae systema III.4 (1613), 321: Unde etiam patet, vehementer errare eos, qui in 
Eucharistia duplex signum esse statuunt, unum externum, nempe panem et vinum; alterum inter-
num, nempe corpus et sanguinem Christi.
71 It is true that Luther criticized in his De captivitate Babylonica from 1520 the scholastic 
focus on the sacraments as signs (WA 6:518 and 533). But since he aimed to emphasize the prom-
ise contained in them, he necessarily came back on their semiotic nature and finally even excluded 
penitence from the list of acceptable sacraments since it lacked a visible sign (ibid. 572).
72 See Thomas J. Davis, This is My Body. The Presence of Christ in Reformation Thought 
(Grand Rapids MI, 2008) and Joachim von Soosten, ‘Präsenz und Repräsentation. Die Marburger 
Unterscheidung’, in Die Gegenwart Jesu Christi im Abendmahl, ed. Dietrich Korsch (Leipzig, 
2005), 99-122.
73 E.g. Balthasar Meisner, Philosophia sobria I.4.6 (Wittenberg, 1614), 1085: Signum sacra-
mentale duplex a nobis Theologis statuitur. Vel enim sumitur pro re terrestri, aut elemento visibili, 
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For Zwingli and his followers, however, since the sacramental elements did not 
contain anything beyond themselves, they simply signified Gods salutary action 
in man.74
Yet, this reformed restriction of sacraments to mere signs is rather close to 
what Duns Scotus and the Nominalists said, who also denied the sacraments to 
have an intrinsic effect, but conceived of them as pure signs on whose applica-
tion God alone produced the grace. The Lutheran position, on the other hand, 
with its emphasis on the eventful character of a sacrament, had its similarities 
with the late medieval Thomist approach – in protestant scholasticism, Lutheran 
theologians went as far as explicitly calling the sacraments instrumental causes 
of grace.75 But while in the late Middle Ages the two theological positions were 
discussed as the duae famosae opiniones without leading to an insurmountable 
break between their defenders, the dissension was, in early Protestantism, at the 
very heart of the split-up into different denominations. There really was more 
at stake in this innerprotestant debate, and that is apparently why these Protes-
tant authors started to expand the theological debate into questions that formerly 
were treated as purely logical or semiotic problems. Obviously, the split-up was 
so fundamental that it affected other disciplines as well.
The proper reasons for the Lutherans’ rejection of the Augustinian definition 
are thus to be found in their sacramental theology. In fact, for them, Augustine’s 
definition was problematic in a twofold way according to their double under-
standing of the semiotic value of a sacrament. One side of the problem con-
cerned the well-known restriction to sensible things. When the conglomerate 
of bread and the real present Christ was said to signify as a whole Gods prom-
ise of grace, one crucial part of that sign, namely the real present Christ, was 
not sensible at all.76 But this is only one side of the problem. Because, when, 
quod rem coelestem significat, ut in veteri, exhibet, ut in Novo Testamento. Vel sumitur pro toto 
Sacramento, constante ex re terrena et coelesti, mystice unitis, et certo ritu dispensandis. Atque 
huius signi sacramentalis signatum est promissio gratiae.
74 See already Zwingli’s De vera et falsa religione commentarius 15, in Huldreich Zwinglis 
sämtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1914), 3,761: Coena dominica damus experimentum, quod morte 
Christi fidamus, qum gratulantes et laeti adsumus in eo coetu, qui domino gratias agit pro bene-
ficio redemptionis, quod moriendo pro nobis liberaliter dedit.
75 Johannes Gerhard, Loci theologici 18.1, ed. E. Preuss (Berlin, 1866), 4,169: De quocunque 
effectus praedicatur, illud est causa ejusdem vel principalis vel instrumentalis. Atqui de sacra-
mentis praedicatur effectus regenerationis, mundationis, remissionis peccatorum et salutis etc. 
Ergo sunt ejusdem causa vel principalis, vel instrumentalis. Non principalis, quia hic honor soli 
Deo competet. Ergo instrumentalis. See Hermann Kahl, De subjecto et adiuncto (Wittenberg, 
1652), fol. A3v: Sacramenta sunt signa exhibitiva, quia simul porrigunt id quod signant, utpote 
sunt efficacia organa regenerationis et gratiae divinae.
76 See, e.g., Balthasar Meisner, Philosophia sobria I.4.6 (1614), 1087f.: Ut autem aliquid 
signum sit μεταδοτικὸν vel exhibitivum, ad hoc non requiritur visibilitas aut sensibilitas. Quod 
enim tantum visibile est, id tantum corporeum est et terrenum, ideoque spiritualem gratiam 
conferre aut obsignare nequit. […] Quam ob causam nulla res visibilis et externa absque re 
invisibili et interna certo verbo addita, appellationem signi obsignantis et exhibentis meretur.
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on the other hand, the bread, taken alone, was said to signify the body of Christ, 
but Christ really was present in the Eucharist, then the sacrament signified itself 
and not aliquid aliud, something else, as the Augustinian definition required. 
The old problems of late medieval logic reappeared thus in Lutheran sacramen-
tal theology. And unsurprisingly, one finds a further parallel to the late medieval 
debate. Since, to keep the possibility to count the sacraments among the signs, 
Lutherans had to concede that there is not necessarily a real distinction between 
a signifier and its signified, so that – like the Thomists – they explicitly admit-
ted the possibility that a sign can be self-referential.77
When Timpler, on the other hand, insisted – with the exception of the 
concepts – on the sensual perceptibility of any sign and on the real distinction 
between sign and signified, he also could easily resort to a set of arguments 
that already had been developed in late medieval semiotics; but even though 
he used these arguments in his metaphysics, he, as well, was not really looking 
for a philosophical, but rather for a theological point against the Lutheran 
understanding of the Eucharist.78 His insistence on the Augustinian definition 
was thus motivated by his theological convictions, and the definition suited his 
purposes so well that the Lutherans, in turn, could not do otherwise but explic-
itly reject it.
4. Conclusion
In order to conclude this short survey, one may focus on the rather surprising 
continuities in the late medieval and early modern reception of Augustine’s def-
inition of a sign. The same aspects in his definition were conceived as problem-
atic: its restriction of signs to sensible things, and the claim that a sign had to 
signify something else than itself. Interestingly enough, the respective handling 
of those problematic aspects was divided, in both late medieval and protestant 
scholasticism, into two comparable groups: the Thomists and Lutherans on the 
one side, and the Scotists, Nominalists and Calvinists on the other. The parallels 
between these groups pertain to semiotic problems such as the possibility of a 
sign’s self-referentiality; they concern theological issues such as the question 
of sacramental causality; and they affect, last but not least, the treatment of the 
Augustinian definition itself. But while, in late medieval scholasticism, the 
77 Zwingli already reminded the problem of a real distinction between sign and signified in 
Luther’s conception of sacraments, see De vera et falsa religione (1914), 18, 800. Among Lutherans, 
the problem is usually solved with recourse to a formal distinction, see Christoph Scheibler, 
Metaphysica divina (1637), 1:421f., and Adam Spengler, Exercitationes metaphysicorum 10.3.4 
(Berlin, 1649), fol. B4r.
78 Besides the passage cited above in note 68, see already his Metaphysicae systema III.4 (1613), 
305: [Non] vere dici potest signatum esse in signo. Errant igitur illi, qui in Eucharistia statuunt 
co[r]pus Christi vere et proprie vel localiter, vel alio modo esse in pane, et de eodem praedicari.
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logical and the theological reception of Augustine’s semiotics took place on 
different tracks, the early protestant authors started to intermingle logics and 
theology. In order to ensure their theological doctrines, they started to develop 
their respective, denominationally customized logics.79 Hence, in the context of 
these denominational logics, the controversial reception of Augustine’s defini-
tion of a sign was a consequence more of sacramental theology than of an 
intrinsically semiotic discussion, and by the prominent approval or rejection of 
his definition, Augustine figured as those denominational logics’ uncommon 
denominator.
79 On these confessionalized logics see Gino Roncaglia, Palaestra rationis. Discussioni su 
natura della copula e modalità nella filosofia ‘scolastica’ tedesca del XVII secolo (Florence, 1996).
